Глобальна економіка

11.5. Міжнародні стратегії на прикладі декількох глобальних акторів

ТНДТЯ. Below is the analysis by Brigadier Arun Sahgal, PhD (Retd), Director of the Forum for Strategic Initiative, a think tank focusing on policy initiatives in national security, diplomacy and Track II dialogues.

“As the new National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government forms its cabinet, it is worth considering the implications of the electoral verdict on India’s security calculations. Importantly it can be expected that India’s strategic and security calculations will be driven by nationalist and more decisive political leadership revolving around enlightened self interest. What this means is that India centric concerns and imperatives on larger global or regional issues will be the hallmark of a new BJP-led NDA government.

In practical terms, relations with the U.S. as well as major Asian players like China, Japan, South Korea and ASEAN will be driven by perceptions of their impact on long-term Indian economic and security interests. This implies that the U.S. pivot to Asia and Chinese assertiveness will be evaluated in terms of how they affect Indian interests, with the policy responses shaped accordingly, rather than being driven by the demands of larger collective security or economic groupings.

This does not mean that India is suddenly going to chart an independent course; rather, what it implies is that all options within the broader strategic framework of the Asia-Pacific will be closely analyzed from Indian perspectives and the policy response crafted accordingly. This is hardly unprecedented, but the emphases will shift, backed by greater political conviction and in concert with a defined national agenda and Indian vision. There is every likelihood that the new government may go ahead and issue a white paper on India’s national security strategy.

In the initial phases of an NDA Government, relations with the U.S. will remain largely transactional, implying greater quid pro quo: attempts at trade restrictions, visa issues, transfer of technology etc. will all be evaluated at the altar of strict reciprocity. Strategic partnership will also be evaluated on its long term regional impact and understandings of long term US regional commitments. While there is no doubt commonality of interest in maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific and preventing the emergence of a Sino- centric Asia, India is unlikely to blindly follow U.S. strategic calculations. Rather, it will shape its responses on its own understanding of the state of play and the long-term consequences. Issues like natural allies and concerts

of democracies will be downplayed in favor of a more pragmatic approach to relations.

Economic and political relations with Japan could see an upswing, although the new government will not enter into strategic partnerships or arrangements that are manifestly aimed at containing China. With Japan, the accent will be on greater economic partnership and developing a joint strategic vision - such as sea lines of communication - that helps secure the global commons. Improving the domestic investment climate by revoking or revamping archaic laws, the new Modi government will go all out to woo Japanese investors, making economic rather than security and strategic relations the underpinning of bilateral relations.

With China, India will seek a different kind of relations. The new government will be less paranoid when it comes to Chinese investment, although restrictions and caution in sensitive sectors will remain a hallmark.

Closer economic partnership implies investment and trade on more equal terms (a reduced trade surplus and equal investment opportunities). Strong political leadership shorn of political compulsions is likely to be more decisive in moving China toward greater reciprocity. In strategic terms, India will seek to avoid unnecessarily needling China with any explicit or implicit containment strategies, implying that New Delhi will not be party to any quadrilateral or multilateral initiatives that have containment in mind. In fact, the new leadership is more likely to push an agenda for greater strategic cooperation to encourage more balanced Chinese behavior, acting as a regional moderator rather than balancer. Yet even while pursuing a policy of more engagement, the new government will act to enhance and modernize military capabilities and improve infrastructure in border areas.

To be sure, dealing with China will be an incremental process underpinned by comprehensive economic engagement backed by credible capability development dictated solely by core Indian interests.

In terms of regional security, the NDA/BJP manifesto makes an interesting commitment of working towards strengthening regional forums like SAARC and ASEAN. The new government is likely to focus and push toward greater economic integration and the resolution of outstanding bilateral issues. Two broad perspectives can be envisioned.

First, the new Indian government will attempt to improve both political and economic relations. It will clearly define its core interests and respect those of its regional partners. Effort will be made to resolve outstanding issues in the spirit of mutual accommodation with greater Indian investment and trade, aspects relating to trade concessions, and investment in infrastructure projects as inducements. The concerns of Indian federal states neighboring these countries will be taken up in a spirit of mutual accommodation.

Second, on contentious issues such as illegal immigration, river sharing, the rights of fishermen, and the growing Chinese footprints, New Delhi will seek resolution without the internal politics. In other words, the new government will tell Bangladesh about its concerns regarding illegal immigration without being overly worried about West Bengal or Assam politics. Similarly, Sri Lanka will be told in clear terms about Tamils and fishing rights and their impact on India. The center will not allow states to hijack the policy agenda, although they will be consulted. What this implies is a freer hand in shaping regional policies, greater engagement, and enhanced economic relations. In short, more sensitivity.

With Pakistan, as in the era of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, every effort will be made to have a constructive relationship, with two clearly defined redlines. First, cross-border terror will have to stop. Second, attempts by Pakistan to play the jihadi card, ratchet up border tensions, or use its deep state to undermine Indian interests in India and Afghanistan will elicit a strong Indian response. In short, another Mumbai 26/11 will not produce a tepid response. Nor will India tolerate major military or nuclear inroads that pose a critical challenge to India.

Nonetheless, as with China, effort will be made to build a new partnership based on trade, commerce, and transit rights. There will in the initial stages be strict reciprocity with Pakistan unless the new government sees Islamabad as willing to move forward in easing its fixation on Kashmir and helping to improve bilateral tensions. A policy of cautious optimism without the emotional baggage is likely to be the hallmark of the Modi government’s Pakistan policy.

Afghanistan and Iranian policies are likely to see less change, although engagement could deepen if the strategic environment is conducive. Economic projects like Chabahar Port and greater investment in mining, and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline will all be on the table. Indian concerns will be dictated by maintaining peace and stability, undermining radical movements, and its increasingly critical energy requirements. Pakistani efforts to intimidate Indian interests will draw a much sharper response. The government will hope that a robust Pakistan policy backed by strong political leadership will produce a tangible impact and restrain Pakistan from following an anti-Indian agenda. Whereas boots on ground are not anticipated, India could at a future date take over some training duties from the British as part of a larger international effort to bolster the capabilities of the Afghan security forces.

Relations with Russia will remain high on India’s foreign policy and security agenda, principally because of the changing geo-strategic environment and the continued dependence of Indian armed forces on Russian weapons. India-China-Russian engagement could see a major shift if

Modi’s engagement with China begins to bear fruit. This will deepen trilateral relations which would then need to be balanced with strategic partnerships with both the U.S. and Japan. Post-Ukraine crisis Russia is looking to deepen its energy commitments; how these play out will also be important and will help shape policy options.

Overall, expect to see a more robust policy shaped by a strong and selfconfident leadership. Policy formulation will largely be centered on greater economic engagement, safeguarding core Indian interests backed by credible military power. A gradual shift from a sole dependence on soft power to a mix of soft and hard power is likely.

Of course, all of the above is based on the likely approach taken by the new government. Execution is another question, and only time will give an answer [11].


The national strategy of defense is inseparable from the national

strategy of development. The latter drives the former. The former provides shielding to the latter. A strong defense project favors a strong development project. A strong development project is guided by the following principles, whatever its remaining guidelines are:

a) National independence achieved by the mobilization of physical, economic and human resources to invest in the country’s production potential. Taking advantage of foreign savings without depending on them;

b) National independence achieved by an autonomous technological capacity building, including the spatial, cybernetic and nuclear strategic sectors.

Whoever does not master critical technologies is neither independent for defense nor for development; and

c) National independence ensured by the democratization of educational and economic opportunities, and by the opportunities to extend public participation in the decision-making processes of the political and economic life of a country. Brazil will not be independent until part of the population lacks the appropriate conditions to learn, work and produce [12, p. 8-9].

The state component of the defense industry will aim at producing what the private sector is not able to design or manufacture, in the medium and short term, profitably. It will, therefore, operate at the technological top, rather than at the technological bottom. It will keep strong ties with the advanced research centers of the Armed Forces and with Brazilian academic institutions.

The State will help to attract the foreign clientele for the national defense industry. However, the continuity of production should be organized so as not to depend on having to attract or retain such clientele. Therefore, the State will recognize that in many production lines, that specific industry will have to operate in a “cost plus margin” regime, thus, under strict regulatory regimen.

The future of national defense technological capacity building depends more on the qualification of human resources and less on the development of an industrial apparatus. Thence the preference for the policy of scientist qualifying on basic and applied sciences, already mentioned in the discussion on the space, cybernetics and nuclear sectors.

In the effort to reorganize the national defense industry, partnerships with other countries will be attempted, aiming to develop a national technological capacity in order to gradually reduce the need to purchase services and finished products from abroad. Brazil will always make clear to the foreign parties that it intends to be a partner, and not a client or buyer. The country is far more interested in partnerships to strengthen its independent capacity building, than in purchasing finished products and services. In principle, these partnerships should consider that substantial part of research and manufacturing should be done in Brazil, and will gain further importance when they are an expression of comprehensive strategic associations [12, p. 35].

The Science, Technology and Innovation for National Defense Policy is intended to encourage the scientific and technological development, and the innovation, in the interest of national defense. This will happen by a national planning to the development of high-tech products, with the coordinate involvement of the military and civilian scientific and technological institutions (STI), the industry and the university, with the definition of priority areas and their respective technologies of interest, and the establishment of instruments to promote the research of materials, equipment and defense or dual use systems, in order to enable technological and operational vanguard based on the strategic mobility, on the flexibility and on the capacity to dissuade or to surprise [12, p. 52].

Brazil is a peaceful country, by tradition and conviction. It lives in peace with its neighbors. It runs its international affairs, among other things, adopting the constitutional principles of non-intervention, defense of peace and peaceful resolution of conflicts. This pacifist trait is part of the national identity, and a value that should be preserved by the Brazilian people. Brazil - a developing country - shall rise to the first stage in the world neither promoting hegemony nor domination. The Brazilian people are not willing to exert their power on other nations. They want Brazil to grow without reigning upon others. However, if Brazil is willing to reach its deserved spot in the world, it will have to be prepared to defend itself not only from aggressions, but equally from threats. Intimidation overrides good faith in the world where we live. Nothing substitutes the engagement of the Brazilian people in the debate and construction of their own defense [12, p. 8].

РОСІЙСЬКА ФЕДЕРАЦІЯ. Amid the ongoing crisis over Ukraine, the Kremlin has adopted a new national strategy that crystallizes trends that have been gaining ground in Russia over the past two years. This development goes beyond the current crisis in Russian-Western relations and has important consequences for Russia’s neighbors, especially the EU.

Essentially, the Kremlin sees Russia’s future as separate from the rest of Europe’s. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s proposal for a Greater Europe stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok, cold-shouldered by many in the EU, has now been finally withdrawn by its author. Instead, Russia will largely rely on its own resources as it seeks to develop its economy, consolidate its political system, and build a strong military.

Russia’s development model will not be autarkic, but neither will it rely too much on exploiting the fruits of globalization. Recent sanctions against it have taught Moscow that these fruits can suddenly grow sour. Instead, Russia will be in the business of import substitution industrialization, promoting domestic agricultural production, and seeking to create a measure of financial autonomy.

The defense industry has long been designated the prime vehicle of industrial and technological innovation. Its main mission, however, will be completing Russia’s military modernization by equipping the country’s armed forces with a wide range of usable instruments of power, both for home defense and force projection.

Confrontation with the West-especially over economic sanctions and information warfare against Russia-has given Russian patriotism a powerful boost. Now, Moscow’s task at hand is to consolidate the bulk of Russian society on the basis of this platform, thus cementing national unity. Those few who disagree would be putting themselves beyond the pale as foreign agents.

Positive national consolidation will be achieved through the Kremlin’s promotion of traditional values. These include the overriding importance of the state; moral and spiritual guidance provided by established religious organizations, with the Orthodox Church playing a salient role; the sanctity of the traditional family; and peaceful cohabitation of different ethnic groups throughout the country.

Crimea, in this context, is simultaneously a symbol of Russia’s national unity across ideological divides and a sign of the country’s newly discovered capacity to push back against its competitors. Once reintegrated into Russia, Crimea will not be abandoned under any circumstances. To make this absolutely clear, the Russian military garrison on the peninsula is being beefed up. NATO, which is now positioning its forces closer to the Russian border, is again designated as a likely adversary.

In pursuing its new foreign policy, Russia will be firm but patient and cautious. Moscow´s agricultural countersanctions against the West have hit a number of Central and Eastern European countries hard. At the same time, Russia will continue to avoid an open armed conflict with the United States and NATO, particularly in Ukraine.

Russia should not be expected to give up on Ukraine, but it can and will change tactics and strategy in its long game there.

Globally, Moscow will be building alliances with non-Western countries to diminish U.S. hegemony. China stands out as a premier partner, with Russia supplying it with more energy and more advanced military technology, while seeking cash and investment in return. India, Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, among others, are also being eyed by Moscow with enhanced interest.

Таблиця 3. Динаміка ВВП розвинутих країн та країн БРІКС, %





Увесь світ




















У середньому






























У середньому





Russia is joining forces with the non-West, but it will not seek to undercut the United States in the areas where U.S. actions do not harm Russian interests, for example, in Afghanistan or Iraq. Unlike in the wake of 9/11, however, Moscow - while having no sympathy whatsoever for Islamist extremists - will point its finger at Washington’s policies as the root cause of regional instability from Libya to Iraq.

Moscow is not completely ignoring Europe, but its European connection has been downgraded more severely than any other relationship. The Russians have been bitterly disappointed by the EU twice in the past six months. First, by France, Germany, and Poland failing to uphold the February 21 agreement they had brokered in Kiev between Viktor Yanukovych and the Ukrainian opposition. Second, by the EU aligning itself with the United States and imposing sectoral sanctions against Russia following the downing of Malaysia

Airlines Flight 17, which both America and Europe blamed on Russia even in the absence of irrefutable evidence.

Given all this, the Kremlin will have even less reason than before to abstain from reaching out to individual EU member states: European unity today means Europe’s solidarity with the United States against Moscow. At the same time, it knows that Europe wants an end to violence in Ukraine more than Kiev’s military victory there. It further understands that the Europeans would want some cooperation with the Russians on Ukraine. This promises a lively relationship, even if a highly transactional and competitive one [13].